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Evolutionary game theory attempts to understand the stability of cooperation in spatially re-
stricted populations. Maintenance of cooperation is difficult, especially in the absence of spatial
restrictions. There have been numerous studies of games played on graphs. It is well recognised
that the underlying graph topology significantly influences the outcome of such games. A natural
yet unexplored question is whether the topology of the underlying structures on which the games
are played possess no role whatsoever in the determination of payoffs. Herein, we introduce a form
of game payoff, which is weakly dependent on the underlying topology. Our approach is inspired by
the well-known microbial phenomenon of quorum sensing. We demonstrate that even with such a
weak dependence, the basic game dynamics and indeed the very nature of the game may be altered.
We can readily appreciate the altruistic nature of
the living world in our surroundings [1, 2]. However,
the charitable nature of cooperators can be exploited
easily by defectors or free riders. A few mechanisms
which support the evolution of cooperators with free
riders of higher fitness are known [3, 4]. Evolution-
ary game theory explains evolutionary outcomes as
a deterministic and frequency-dependent steady state
of the population using game rules [5, 6]. Before its
advent, evolution was considered as a time-dependent
stochastic process [7]. Players are constrained to ad-
here strictly to pure strategies in evolutionary games,
due to their genetic makeup. This can either be co-
operation, C, or defection, D. Each interaction re-
sults in a definite payoff for both players. When two
cooperators interact with each other, they receive a
reward R. Similarly, interactions between two defec-
tors results in punishment, P. On the other hand,
the cooperator receives a sucker’s payoff, S, and the
defector receives a temptation, T , when a cooperator
and a defector interact.
An individual accumulates its payoff from various
interactions with its neighbors. Two interpretations
exist in literature on the role of payoff in fitness deter-
mination: (1) the selectionist approach [8], and, (2)
the naturalist approach [9, 10]. The former considers
game payoff as the sole deciding factor of a player’s fit-
ness. However, according to the latter, game payoff is
only one of the several deciding factors. The prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) is widely studied in evolutionary game
theory, with payoff values satisfying T > R > P > S
[5]. In PD, defection is always the best strategy re-
gardless of the initial configuration of the population.
Since cooperation is not favored in a typical PD sce-
nario, a proper understanding of the maintenance of
cooperation in such scenarios has been the prime fo-
cus for many evolutionary biologists and ecologists
[11]. PD game on different types of graph structures
such as Barabasi-Albert (BA) network, small-world
network, random-regular network etc has been well
investigated [5, 8, 12]. The outcome of the game is
sensitive to the underlying graph structure.
Till date, most of the research on evolutionary game
theory has been primarily concentrated on structured
and spatially restricted populations [13–15]. Stim-
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ulating correspondences between spatial evolution-
ary game theory and nonequilibrium phase transi-
tions have provided a fresh and engaging view to
the concept of universality classes. Indeed, evolution-
ary game theory in structured populations exhibits
critical phase transitions that lie in the universality
class of directed percolation on square lattices. Criti-
cal phase transitions similar to mean-field-type tran-
sitions on random regular graphs and regular small
world networks have also been observed in evolution-
ary games on structured populations. Such spatial re-
strictions constrain players to interact only with their
immediate neighbors or the individuals with whom
the players are connected. In the BA network, such
spatial constraints can lead to the evolution and main-
tenance of cooperation.
Well-mixed populations is another subject of study
in evolutionary game theory. Here, an individual is
free to interact with every other individual in the pop-
ulation. This situation is often modeled using repli-
cator dynamics. A complete graph can be used to
study such scenarios, with each individual being con-
nected to every other, all the time. However, such
structures may not be suitable for the maintenance of
cooperation. Also, there are some fundamental bio-
logical problems with such models. At a certain in-
stant of time, an individual can only interact with a
limited number of neighbors depending on its biolog-
ical capability. As an example we could consider the
extremely common scenario of a “mixed bacterial cul-
ture” in liquid medium. The public goods produced
by a bacterium at any particular instant of time would
diffuse. This diffusion will be decided by the concen-
tration profile in the medium and other factors. Es-
sentially, the immediate neighbors of the bacterium at
that instant are benefited but not neccessarily the en-
tire population. Therefore, modeling well-mixed sce-
narios using a complete graph cannot really be the
choice of preference.
In between these two extremes, intermediate states
arising from mobility, dispersal or random fluctua-
tions could well exist. These fluctuations could arise
due to various reasons ranging from fluctuations in
the graph connectivity to diverse ecological parame-
ters like immigration, temperature or availability of
food. Mobility could have both positive or negative
effect on the maintenance of cooperation. When the
movement of an individual is driven by evolutionary
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2success, it could have a positive impact on the mainte-
nance of cooperation [16, 17]. Mobility has also been
thought to promote cooperation in dynamic groups
via emergent self-assortment dynamics [18]. However,
random dispersal and fluctuations could also prove
detrimental to cooperation [19].
In evolutionary games, the game parameters,
namely the payoffs, are generally invariant. However,
as well-known, when such games are played on graphs,
the underlying network structure can significantly in-
fluence the outcome [8]. Remarkably, in evolution-
ary games on networks, the dependence of payoff on
the underlying topology of the network has not really
been studied. Therefore, the wider ramifications of
spatial restrictions on game payoffs definitely need to
be unravelled. Herein we introduce an appropriately
altered form of payoff, which incorporates the under-
lying topology of the network, and, thence demon-
strate their importance in games played on graphs.
It is simultaneously important to emphasise here
that the notion of a non-invariant payoff matrix is
well-studied in evolutionary game theory literature
[20–26], as outlined below. This is essentially because
the interactions between players depends on many fac-
tors. The fraction of defectors in society affects the
payoff values, which proves to be necessary for de-
scribing evolution [20]. In a different co-evolutionary
framework, self-adaptivity of payoff matrix has also
been implemented for describing the real-world nature
of the players [21, 22]. In addition, the interaction
frequencies encountered by a player could affect the
payoff matrix [23, 24]. Such changes in the nature of
the game have also been witnessed in experiments on
bacteriophages [25]. Furthermore, the noise responsi-
ble for the deviations of traditional payoff values could
even lead to a change in the very nature of the game
itself [26]. Such changes in payoff are also quite well
known in quantum games [27].
Herein, we investigate the widely studied example
of prisoner’s dilemma. Our approach is inspired by
the well-known phenomenon of quorum sensing [28].
In many bacterial populations, quorum sensing plays
an important role in maintaining the community of
cooperators [29]. In game theory, there exist several
different models to understand this phenomenon [30–
32]. It should be noted that the present paper does
not purport to model quorum sensing in any manner.
The central notion of quorum sensing is that the
benefits provided by a group of individuals are more
readily available to the members of its alliance rather
than to the rest of the populace. Herein we have in-
corporated this notion by examining the possible ef-
fect of the position of an individual in the structured
population upon the determination of payoffs. In ex-
isting literature, the impact of spatial restrictions on
the outcome of the game has been studied mostly
via the inherent limitations imposed by the dint of
these interactions rather than through the game pa-
rameters per se. We observe that when measured in
terms of topology dependent pay-offs, the game out-
come demonstrates that cooperation is supported in
the presence of random dispersal. Indeed, changes
can be witnessed in the very nature of the game it-
self. We also show that if the initial cooperation is
very high, then cooperation is most likely to remain
the dominant strategy in the population. Lastly, the
notion of topology dependent payoffs is important for
all games on networks and not just for the case of
prisoner’s dilemma studied herein.
We follow an extremely well-studied game algo-
rithm [8] for simulating evolutionary PD game in
structured populations. Here, each of the N individ-
uals represent a node on a BA network. According to
this algorithm, an individual can interact with all of
its neighbors depending on the population structure.
At every round of game, the individual will accumu-
late payoff according to the game rules. As widely
studied in earlier literature, following values of the
PD game parameters are adopted, 1 < T ≤ 2, R = 1
and P = S = 0.
After the determination of payoff, the strategy of
each individual is updated synchronously. We have
considered imitation as the mechanism for strategy
upgradation in our simulations [3], as detailed be-
low. For the strategy upgradation of an individual,
i; one of its neighbors, j, is randomly selected. Their
respective payoffs Πi and Πj are compared. i up-
grades its strategy whenever Πj > Πi with a prob-
ability of (Πj − Πi)/(Zk∗). Here Z = T − S and
k∗ = max(ki, kj). Here ki and kj is the degree of
i and j respectively. After a transient time of 104
generations, the final number of cooperators, fC , is
counted over 103 generations. The overall simulations
are repeated for each value of the relevant game pa-
rameter for an ensemble of EN networks. The net-
works have N nodes, where each node possesses an
average degree 〈k〉. Data has been collected in the
range T = [1.01, 1.91] at equal intervals. fCi is the
initial fraction of nodes, which are randomly assigned
to be cooperators at the start of the simulations. Ob-
viously (1−fCi) is the initial fraction of nodes, which
are defectors.
The literature on evolutionary games predomi-
nantly considers populations, where all players pos-
sess fixed spatial positions. The number of interac-
tions that every player participates in, depends on
the structure of the static graph. For graphs with
a low average degree, the presence of spatial restric-
tions does not allow a player to interact directly with
every other. Some studies incorporate a higher av-
erage degree of graphs to model well-mixed scenarios
[8]. The extreme case is obviously that of a complete
graph, where each individual is connected with every
other. However, as aforementioned, this has obvious
biological limitations.
In our model, random dispersal, µ, has been incor-
porated as a probability that player, i, interchanges
its strategy with another randomly chosen player [19].
We have studied various levels of µ in our simulations.
Higher dispersal would mitigate the maintenance of
cooperation to a great extent. Herein the players pos-
sess pure strategies, namely cooperation and defec-
tion. Therefore, the interchange of strategy between
two randomly chosen players also signifies that these
players are interchanging their position. However, the
degree sequence of the network is maintained intact,
3FIG. 1. Eqn.1 quantifies the determination of topology dependent payoffs, Π′i, for an individual, i. The original
graph is represented in (a). The “defector graph” is constituted only of defectors and the links among defectors. It
determines altered punishment, P ′i and altered sucker’s payoff, S ′, as represented in (b) and (c) respectively. Similarly, the
“cooperator graph” possesses only cooperators and the links among cooperators. It determines the altered temptation,
T ′i , and altered reward, R′i, as represented in (d) and (e) respectively.
during the entire process. This is essential because
dispersal should not be achieved at the cost of chang-
ing the network structure itself.
FIG. 2. Fraction of cooperators, fC , versus tempta-
tion, T , in the absence and presence of random dispersal,
µ = 2%, 4%, 6% and 8%. Here, the initial fraction of co-
operators, fCi = 0.5. Results are for N = 1024, 〈k〉 = 4
and EN = 200 ensembles. Evidently, increase in µ leads
to loss of cooperation. The standard error is smaller than
the size of the data points.
In general, payoffs are considered to be invariable.
But interactions between the players might depend
on many factors [33]. Our model is inspired by the
well-known phenomenon of quorum sensing. Quorum
sensing is a density dependent occurrence exhibited
by many bacterial species. These bacteria sense cells
at a similar density in their population. Certain genes
are activated only when the cell density reaches a
certain threshold. There are several other examples,
where cooperation depends on similar actions [34].
Here, we are interested in the evolution and main-
tenance of cooperation in the presence of random dis-
persal. The interaction between two players is very
likely to be affected by their own connections with
the remaining players. Therefore, should the reward
acquired by a typical cooperator, C, be determined
merely by those of its nearest cooperator neighbors?
Herein, we demonstrate the consequences when other
cooperators in the population, who are not the im-
mediate neighbors of C are taken into consideration.
Indeed, we show that they can significantly influence
the reward acquired by C. This particular idea of in-
cluding all cooperators in a network instead of merely
the nearest cooperator neighbors is influenced by quo-
rum sensing. The analogy with quorum sensing is that
it is not merely the local neighborhood which always
decides the outcome.
We now introduce the concept of the “coopera-
tor graph”, “defector graph” and topology dependent
payoffs as depicted in Fig. 1. The cooperator graph,
GC , is a virtual construct, achieved simply by pruning
every defector, D, and all connections of D from the
original graph, G(V, E). Here, V and E represent the
set of nodes and edges respectively in G. All edges
between D − D and C − D have been omitted from
G(V, E), while all C−C edges are exclusively retained.
Clearly, GC is then a graph of cooperators only. Sim-
ilarly, the “defector graph”, GD, can be obtained by
omitting the edges of the type C − C and C −D.
We now propose a general form of the topology-
dependent payoff for an individual, i, as
Π′i = Πi exp(aCi + bBi) (1)
Πi is the conventional form of the payoff [8, 10]. Ci and
Bi respectively denote the closeness and betweenness
of i in the network. a and b are the parameters rep-
resenting intra-species and inter-species interactions
respectively. For intra-species interactions (C − C
and D − D); a = 1 and b = 0. Again, in case of
inter-species interactions (C −D and D − C); a = 0
and b = 1. The choice of the altered form of payoff
does not cause any loss of generality, associated with
the conventional payoff matrix [5]. The altered form
4of payoff incorporates the topology of the underlying
structure. Indeed, the nature of this topology changes
from random to regular, clearly Π′ → Π.
Closeness, Ci, of node, i, is the normalized recipro-
cal of the total sum of shortest path lengths between
i and all others nodes in a network of N nodes. Thus,
Ci = N−1∑N−1
j=1 d(j,i)
, where d(j, i) is the shortest path be-
tween node i and every other node j in the network.
Closeness of a node indicates how “close” the node
is to the remaining nodes of the network. We can
draw the same analogy in our cooperator or defector
graphs. A cooperator, who is closer to other coop-
erators, will have the luxury to enjoy higher public
goods. Similarly, a defector, who is closer to the other
defectors, will have higher punishment.
Betweenness, Bi, of node, i, is the fraction of
shortest paths passing through i, when compared to
all pairs of shortest paths in the network. Thus,
Bi =
∑
i 6=j 6=k
σjk(i)
σjk
, where σjk denotes the total num-
ber of shortest paths between nodes j and k, where
i 6= j 6= k. σjk(i) represents only those shortest paths
of σjk, which pass through node i. The importance
of betweenness arises when we are considering inter-
species interactions. It signifies how a defector is in-
teracting with other cooperators or how a cooperator
is interacting with other defectors.
FIG. 3. Fraction of cooperators, fC , versus temptation,
T , in the presence and absence of µ. Results are for: (a)
N = 1024 (b) N = 512 nodes. The initial fraction of co-
operators, fCi = 0.5, and, 〈k〉 = 4, µ = 4%, EN = 200. In
the presence of random dispersal, cooperation is witnessed
to some extent, when measured in terms of the topology
dependent payoff, Π′, rather than the conventional payoff,
Π. The standard error is smaller than the size of the data
points.
We consider the cooperator and defector graph for
the calculation of altered reward, R′i, and altered pun-
ishment, P ′i, respectively. For R′i and P ′i, we consider
only the intra-species interactions. Thus, the form of
the topology dependent payoffs are R′i = Ri exp(Ci)
and P ′i = Pi exp(Ci) respectively. On the other hand,
for the altered payoffs, T ′i and S ′i, the inter-species
interactions are considered.The form of altered temp-
tation and altered punishment is T ′i = Ti exp(Bi) and
S ′i = Si exp(Bi) respectively. In summary, the value of
topology dependent payoffs depend on the spatial po-
sition of the player, and more explicitly on the player’s
centrality in the network. The importance of net-
work measures is well-known in network science [35–
FIG. 4. The fraction of cooperators, fC , at the end of
the simulations with respect to temptation, T , at various
initial fraction of cooperators, fCi , in the presence of ran-
dom dispersal. Results are for N = 512, 〈k〉 = 4, µ = 4%
and EN = 200 ensembles. The standard error is smaller
than the size of the data points.
FIG. 5. The variation of fCi versus T at various values of
fC , as quantified by: (a) conventional payoff, Π, and, (b)
topology dependent payoff, Π′. Red denotes maintenance
of cooperation and blue its absence. Significant enhance-
ment of cooperation in presence of random dispersal can
be observed, when measured in terms of Π′ rather than Π.
Results are for N = 512, 〈k〉 = 4, µ = 4% and EN = 200.
39]. However, we cannot overemphasise that more
than the precise form of the payoffs, herein we want
to stress on the importance of incorporating the effect
of the underlying topology on the game payoffs.
In the absence of random dispersal, cooperation ob-
viously dominates the population due to the presence
of hubs [8]. Fig. 2 presents the behaviour of fCi ver-
sus T at various values of random dispersal, namely,
µ = 0, 2%, 4%, 6% and 8%. With increasing µ, co-
operators are unable to accumulate higher payoffs as
expected [40]. Increasing µ leads to a random change
in the strategies of players and the cooperator fraction
goes down with increase in T . For obvious reasons, we
have chosen an intermediate value of µ = 4% for our
remaining simulations, rather than choosing a higher
or lower value of µ.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the behaviour of cooperation,
when measurement is done using topology dependent
payoff, Π′, as compared to the conventional payoff, Π.
5FIG. 6. Plot of ∆fC = (fCΠ′ − fCΠ) versus T . Here, fCΠ
and fCΠ′ denote the cooperator fraction in the absence
and presence of altered payoff, Π′, respectively. Results
are for N = 512, 〈k〉 = 4, µ = 4% and EN = 200.
We observe that when measured by Π′, cooperation
is maintained to some extent, irrespective of µ.
We have also investigated the effect of initial coop-
erator fraction at the start of the simulations, fCi , on
maintenance of cooperation. In Fig. 4, we observe
the behavior of fC versus T at different values of fCi .
Clearly, only rather higher values of fCi can lead to
the maintenance of cooperation at higher T .
In Fig. 5, we compare fC at different values of
fCi and T , when measured by both conventional and
topology dependent payoff at different values of fCi
at µ = 4%. The importance of measuring by altered
payoff becomes immediately clear. The maintenance
of cooperation upon consideration of topology depen-
dent payoffs is much higher in comparison to the sce-
narios, where they are not considered. To understand
this further, we create a “differential plot”. fCΠ and
fCΠ′ denote the cooperator fraction in the absence and
presence of Π′ respectively. ∆fC = (fCΠ′ − fCΠ) has
been plotted with respect to T in Fig. 6 at various
fCi . A decreasing slope implies loss of cooperation,
when measured by topology dependent payoffs. On
the other hand, a positive slope seems to signify the
tendency of cooperators to maintain their population.
We can observe the peaks shifting towards higher T ,
with an increase in fCi . This indicates the prevalence
of cooperation at higher fCi even in the presence of
µ, when measured by Π′.
As aforementioned, according to the basic rules of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, T > R and 1 < T ≤ 2.
In the present scenario, the average value of altered
temptation 1 < T ′ ≤ 2. Remarkably, however in Fig.
7, we observe R′ > T ′ in a certain region. This region
would obviously seem to violate the basic condition
of PD. However, experiments on bacteriophages have
shown that “escaping” PD is well known in literature
[25]. Herein, drawing an analogy with Ref. [25], al-
tered reward helps the cooperators in escaping the PD
game and the associated strategy of commons. The
cooperators engage themselves in either Harmony or
Coordination games [12], when measured in terms of
the altered reward. Similar instances of changes in the
nature of the game is well-known in literature [26, 27].
Does the underlying topology of the graphs on
which games are played have no role whatsoever, for
FIG. 7. Fraction of cooperators, fC , versus (T ′−R′). Re-
sults are for N = 1024, 〈k〉 = 4, EN = 200 ensembles and
fCi = 0.5. In the shaded region, R′ > T ′, which indicates
that players are not participating in PD anymore. There-
fore, the players engage in either harmony or coordination
game, depending on the value of S ′ and P ′ [5, 12].
measuring the dynamics and outcome of the game?
Non-invariant payoffs have been well-studied in game
theory [20–26]. Therefore, inspired by quorum sens-
ing, herein we propose an appropriately altered form
of payoff which is dependent on the underlying topol-
ogy of the network. The effects of incorporating the
underlying topology in the game payoffs is clearly
demonstrated. Even if these topology dependent pay-
offs possess a weak dependence on the underlying
topology, significant changes in the outcome and in-
deed in the nature of the game itself is witnessed. The
role of topology in networks is extremely well studied.
Future studies can unravel a more precise and sensi-
tive dependence of the payoff on network topology.
As well known, mean-field-type phase transitions on
random regular graphs and regular small world net-
works are seen in evolutionary games on structured
populations. It would be interesting to examine this
behaviour with topology dependent payoffs.
We thank Vishwesha Guttal of Indian Institute of
Science, Bangalore for insightful discussions.
[1] D. L. Cheney, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A 108, 10902
(2011).
[2] J. L. Sachs and A. C. Hollowell, MBio 3, e00099-12
(2012).
[3] M. A. Nowak, Science 314, 1560-1563 (2006).
[4] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, BioSystems 99, 109 (2010).
[5] G. Szabo and G. Fath, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[6] E. Frey, Physica A 389, 4265 (2009).
[7] J. M. Smith, Physica D 22, 43 (1986).
[8] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
098104 (2005).
[9] H. Ohtsuki, C. Hauert, E. Lieberman and M. A.
Nowak, Nature 441, 502 (2006).
[10] A. Szolnoki and M Perc, Eur. Phys. J. B. 67, 337
6(2009).
[11] J. Gore, H. Youk, and A. V. Oudenaarden, Nature
459, 253 (2009).
[12] S.Sinha, S. Ghosh and S. Roy, Int J Adv Eng Sci Appl
Math 11, 138 (2019).
[13] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May, Nature 359, 826 (1992).
[14] M. Perc, A. Szolnoki and G. Szabo, Phys. Rev. E 78,
066101 (2008).
[15] C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta and A. Sanchez, Phys. Rev.
E, 80, 046106 (2009).
[16] R. Chiong and M. Kirley, Physica A, 39, 3915 (2012).
[17] M. Cardinot, C. ORiordan, J. Griffith and A Szolnoki,
New J. Phys., 21, 073038 (2019).
[18] J Joshi, ID Couzin, SA Levin and V Guttal PLoS
Comput. Biol. 13: e1005732 (2017).
[19] A. Antonioni and M. Tomassini, PLOS ONE 6,
e25555 (2011).
[20] M. Tomochi and M Kono, Phys. Rev. E 65, 026112
(2002).
[21] S. Y. Chong and X. Yao, In IEEE Symposium on
Computational Intelligence and Games, 103 (2006).
[22] D. Ashlock, E. Y. Kim and W. Ashlock, In IEEE Con-
ference on Computational Intelligence and Games.
219 (2010).
[23] M. Perc, Coherence resonance in a spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game, New J. Phys. 8, 22 (2006).
[24] N. Masuda, Proc. Biol. Sci. 274, 1815 (2007).
[25] P. E. Turner and L. Chao, Am. Nat. 161, 497 (2003).
[26] J. Tanimoto, Phys. Rev. E 76, 041130, (2007).
[27] E. W. Piotrowski and J. Sadkowski, Int. J. Theor.
Phys., 42, 1089 (2003).
[28] M. Schuster, D. J. Sexton and B. A. Hense, Front.
Microbiol. 8, 885 (2017).
[29] T. Czaran and R. F. Hoekstra, PLOS ONE 4, e6655
(2009).
[30] A. Lotem, M. A. Fishman and L. Stone, Proc. Biol.
Sci. 270, 199 (2003).
[31] S. P. Diggle, A. S. Griffin, G. S. Campbell, S. A. West,
Nature 450, 411 (2007).
[32] A. Traulsen and M. A. Nowak, PLOS ONE 2, e270,
(2007).
[33] R. J. Requejo and J. Camacho, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
038701 (2012).
[34] R. Requejo and J. Camacho, J. Theor. Biol., 272, 35
(2011).
[35] S. J. Banerjee and S. Roy, arXiv:1209.3737 (2012).
[36] S. Roy and V. Filkov, Phys. Rev. E 80, 040902(R)
(2009).
[37] S. J. Banerjee, S. Sinha and S. Roy, Phys. Rev. E 91,
022807 (2015).
[38] R. K. Grewal, D. Mitra and S. Roy, Bioinformatics
31, 3608 (2015).
[39] S. J. Banerjee, et al., Sci. Rep. 5, 17271 (2015).
[40] E. A. Sicardi, H. Fort, M. H. Vainstein and J. J. Aren-
zon, J. Theor. Biol. 256, 240 (2009).
